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ABSTRACT
THE DEVELOPM ENTS IN TURKISH AUTO INDUSTRY 
AND FACTORS THAT AFFECT DEMAND
Giirsev GÜR
Master o f Business Administration 
SUPERVISOR: Assoc. Prof M ura t MERCAN 
September 1996, 92 pages
Auto Industiy is very important for nations and governments as it plays a key role 
when determining the competitive power of a country. The industry provides 
employment and increase GNP as well as provide governments tax income. In this 
study, the developments in Turkish Auto Industiy, its competition power and 
productivity figures are summarized. An important problem o f the indusli'y which is 
producing behind economies of scale is discussed and the factors that alTect the 
domestic demand for autos are presented. The export and import trends in the sector 
are briefly examined. The effects of the Customs Union Agreement and the probable 
effects of the New Duty - Free second hand auto import decision o f the government 
are presented. The government decisions play the most important role for the future of 
Turkish Auto Industry.
Key Words: Turkish Auto Industry, producing behind economies o f scale, demand 
factors, government decisions.
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TÜRK OTOMOBİL ENÖÜSTRİSİN0EKİ GELİŞMELER 
VE TALEBİ ETKİLEYEN FAKTÖRLER
Gürsev GÜR
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İşletme Enstitüsü 
Tez Yöneticisi; Doçent Dr. Murat MERCAN 
Eylül 1996, 92 şayia
Otomobil endüstrisi bir ülkenin rekabet gücünün ölçülmesinde önemli bir role sahip 
oluğu için hem milletler hem de devletler için çok önemlidir. Endüstri bir istihdam 
kaynağı olması ve GSMH’ yi yükseltmesinin yanısıra devlete vergi geliri de 
sağlamaktadır. Bu tezde Türk Otomobil Endüstrisindeki gelişmeler, endüstrinin 
rekabet gücü ve verimliliği özetlenmiştir. Endüstrinin önemli poblemi olan ekonomik 
ölçeklerde üretememe ve yerli talebe etki eden faktörler ele ahnmştır. Sektördeki 
ihracat ve ithalat trendlerinden kısaca bahsedilmiştir. Gümrük Birliği Anlaşmasının 
etkileri ve devletin yeni bedelsiz ikinci el araç itlıalat kararının olası etkileri 
sunulmuştur. Devlet kararlan Türk Otomobil Endüstrisinin geleceği için en önemli rolü 
oynamaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler; Türk Otomobil Endüstrisi, ekonomik ölçeklerin gerisinde üretme, 
talep faktörleri, devlet kararlan.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Importance of Auto Industry:
Auto industiy is the world’s largest manufacturing activity with nearly 50 million new 
vehicles produced every year. The industry connects steel, iron, rubber, glass, textiles, 
plastics, machine tools, electronics and various other industrial products.
Auto industry, as of inputs used in manufacturing and of outputs at the final stage, is 
considered as a sign of industrial development both in developing countries as well as 
in more developed ones. Auto industry was the leading sector in the United States in 
the inter war years, it played the same role in Western Europe in the fifties and sixties 
and it became the crucial barometer of economic progress in a number o f countries in 
the sixties and seventies (Jenkins, 1987).
The industry provides benefits to nations’ economies; by providing employment, 
increasing production and GNP. It also increases governments’ revenue by taxes. .As 
the industry is a leading source o f employment and investment, it is proteeted from 
competition even in developed eountries. The government intervention and the 
relationship between government and the industiy is critically important. A very
striking example to the afFeet o f government intervention is the Brazilian auto industiy. 
Aeeording to the researehers, the suceess of Brazilian industry at developing a motor 
vehicle industry is not the product of mere market forces but, to the contrary, the 
result o f direct government intervention (Prud’home , 1983).
In every auto producing nation, governments do several things to influence their 
companies competitiveness. These interventions may be either in the macro or micro 
level. Macro economic policies are not supposed to discriminate among industries but 
politically prominent industries such as autos are hurt or benefited more than others. 
Governments around the world intervene in the auto industry at a macro level.
Auto industry is also considered as an important source o f technological leadership. In 
just a few years, the auto industry has undergone a dramatic transformation, from a 
stodgy mature smokestack industry to a cutting-edge, high-tech industry where 
technological innovation is creating not only the car o f the future but also the factory 
of the future ( D yer, 1987).
As a result o f these reasons - employment, investment, growth, and technological 
leadership- the auto industry is considered to play a central role in both global 
economics and politics.
1.2 Scope and Objective
In this study, the history, development, factors that affected development, three 
technological stages o f the world auto industry - craft production, mass production and 
lean production will be briefly discussed in the second chapter. World auto 
manufacturing today will also be given in the second chapter.
This will be followed by an outlook to Turkish economy and industry in the third 
chapter. History and development and cooperation of allied industry are also in the 
third chapter. Some figures about employment, productivity and competition power of 
Turkish Auto Industry are given. The lack o f stable demand which affects the 
industry’s development negatively and the factors that affect this demand also appear 
in this chapter. Government policies are the key determinants for the auto industiy, the 
effects of the customs union agreement and new decision about duty free second-hand 
auto imports are tried to be discussed together with export and import figures of 
Turkish Auto Industry in the third chapter. A regression analysis is also carried out in 
the third in order to test the determinants o f the demand for autos. The result o f the 
regression is discussed in this chapter and the variables and outputs are given inthe 
appendix.
The fourth chapter is devoted for the conclusion. In this chapter some 
recommendations especially for the government are suggested for the well being o f the 
auto industry in the future.
The first objective o f this study is to examine the factors that affect the development o f 
Turkish Auto Industry. The government decisions always play the main role for auto 
industries both in Turkey and in the world. The important determinants of the demand 
for cars in Turkish Auto Industry are also examined .
The second objective is to address the reasons for the dramatic fall in the demand in 
Turkish Auto Industry. Due to this dramatic fall the auto industry has been affected in 
a negative way although it should have been supported and strengthened while entering 
to customs union with EC. The negative effects o f the new duty-free second hand auto 
imports for both Turkish Economy and Turkish Auto Industry are also predicted.
At the end some recommendations will be presented which are mostly for the concern 
of the Turkish Government as it plays the key role in development o f the auto industry. 
The government should take these recommendations into account as the auto industry 
is one o f the most important industries by providing employment and increasing 
production and GNP.
CHAPTER 2
WORLD AUTO INDUSTRY
2.1 History and Develonment
The first steam-engine car was made in 1769 by Nicholas Joseph CUGNOT in Europe, 
then in 1885 two researchers Karl BENZ and Gottlieb DAIMLER discovered the first 
internal combustion engine, the power unit which lies at the heart of the modern 
automobile and commercial vehicles. Its incorporation into the automobile followed in 
Western Europe, but production levels remained limited. The roads were primitive, 
automobile was seen as a luxury product and was manufactured in small batches for 
discerning users. By 1906, two decades after the first automobile had appeared, a total 
o f only 50,000 vehicles produced per year throughout the Western Europe 
(Hoffman, 1988).
World auto industry can be examined in three basic phases between the years 1910 and 
1990. The first fundamental change occurred during 1910 when Ford introduced 
Model T which is mass produced. Before mass production, autos produced in small 
batches by small scaled producers. This mass production brought an oligopolistic 
structure in the world auto industry in the benefit o f American producers during
1920’s. During 1920 more than 2 million autos were produced in America by mass 
production.
In this period, though United States industry was quite dominant, the primitive 
technology of shipping offered a form of natural protection to producers of West 
Europe. This was complemented by a series o f government policies with an adoption 
of high protective tariffs. This not only enabled Western Europeans to establish their 
auto industry but also forced the United States producers to enter the European 
market by establishing plants abroad. Whilst inducing this transfer o f United States 
manufacturing technology and protecting domestic industry, the small size o f most 
Western European markets meant that few of their producers were able to reap the 
growth of economies of scale, and by outbreak of the second World War, the 
technological dominance of the United States producers remained (Hoffman, 1988).
During the World War II production of almost all industries except the defense 
industiy is ceased. After World War II, the development of the Common Market 
allowed the continental producers to reap continent-wide-scale economies. 
Consequently, the second fundamental change occurred and during the period o f 1950 
to 1960 a number of Western European auto companies expanded. During this time 
they became competitive producers, but unlike their United States counterparts whose 
product technology had degenerated into a standardized series of product 
differentiating facelifts, the Western European firms maintained a high rate of product 
innovation (Hoffman, 1988).
The third phase begins, after the development o f low cost, demand driven production 
organization of Japanese auto industry, during 1970’s. This development was 
unexpected, because during the first years after World War II, the capacity o f Japan to 
have an auto industry was in doubt. During 1960’s the great American and European 
auto makers regarded their rivals in Japan ( if they regarded them at all ) as 
insignificant producers of cheap cars that seemed unlikely to capture more than a 
marginal share of the world auto market. Arising from the small and fragmented nature 
of the Japanese markets in the 1950’s and 1960’s- which contrasted sharply with the 
mass market available in the United States in the early twentieth century- the Japanese 
automobile firms were forced to adopt a more flexible attitude to automobile 
production (Hoffman, 1988). As a result instead of taking the advantage of a supply- 
driven system in which the firm could concentrate on maximizing the flow of similar 
automobiles out o f factory, the basis of production is changed to a demand-driven one. 
Initially this was forced on the producers as a way o f coping with an unstable pattern 
of consumption. However, as the system o f production became fine-tuned to cope with 
the variation in the output, this became a competitive edge for the Japanese car 
producers. Following this, the emphasis on competition has changed from price- 
competition to product-innovation.
By the early 1980’s the Japanese producers had become world leaders in building high- 
quality cars at low cost. They have competitive standards that American and European 
auto producers are hard pressed to match. But as the Japanese producers gained 
market share, they encountered more and more political resistance. During this period, 
the American and European auto companies instead o f learning from their Japanese
competitors, focused their energies on erecting trade barriers and other competitive 
impediments and by the mid-1980’s the auto Mecca of the World is no longer Detroit, 
but Japan (Dyer, 1987).
Consequently, the Japanese have shown that there is an important difference between 
working hard and working efficiently, and between work that is a bore and work that is 
a challenge (Jones, 1989).
2.2 Factors that Affected Development of World Auto Industry
The American Auto Industry has passed cyclical ups and downs for decades. The 
industry was in place during 1930’s, the Big Three- General Motors, Ford and 
Chrysler- dominated the domestic market.
Two revolutions led to the industry’s concentration. The first was a revolution in 
production; Ford’s discovery of how to build autos on massive scale. The second was 
a revolution in marketing, the General Motors strategy to cover the market nationwide 
with products appealing to different segments o f the buying people (Dyer, 1987).
The automotive market o f 1920’s became crowded with smaller automakers serving to 
local markets, but the number decreased from a 160 of 1920 to 23 in 1930.The small 
independent producers-Kaiser and Willys, Studebaker and Packard, Nash-Kelvinator 
and Hudson merged or left the business. GM’s success on selling based on the 
fundamental change in the market. GM understood that as the better roads were built
and per capita income climbed, consumers were beginning to favor cars with additional 
features rather than durable and low priced Model T of Ford. In such a world, the 
biggest companies with nationwide dealer networks and advertising, enjoyed a 
substantial competitive advantage over their smaller rivals. So the scale economies and 
in production and marketing transformed the nature o f competition in the industry. By 
the end of the 1920’s GM, Ford and Chrysler dominated the market and the industry 
had become a big business.
The relationship between management and labor, on the one hand and between 
business and the government on the other are the key dimensions in auto industry. The 
first relationship determines a company’s ability to organize and motivate employees to 
make cost efficient and quality products, and the second structures the incentives that 
prompt companies to invest and grow. Together, these relationships determine the 
setting or context in which companies compete in global industries (Batchelor, 1994).
Ford was the first major producer who moved outside United States with 
manufacturing operations in Canada in 1904. They used this plant to export 
throughout the British commonwealth; GM and Chrysler copied Ford in this respect. 
As it was cheaper to export parts than fully assembled cars to many countries, the 
American multinationals set up assembly plants around the world. Protectionism 
overseas gave way to this strategy. European governments put high tariffs on imported 
autos during World War I which led American producers to build and acquire plants in 
Europe. In Japan, however more extreme measures have been taken by government to 
abandon American branch assembly operations in the 1930’s.
The American market was enormous in those years; the auto sales in the United States 
were higher than the rest of the World until 1960’s. During 1955 about 80 % of all car 
registrations in the world were in North America. The per capita income was the 
highest and the roads were very sophisticated. The market was large and growing, 
between 1947 and 1967 the American auto producers averaged a return of 16.7 %. 
Imports, generally from Volkswagen and Renault remained 10 % of sales before 
coming of Japanese in the late 1960’s.
The links between Washington and Detroit were many and varied. Over time, however 
a general pattern was clear, the federal government became increasingly involved in the 
affairs of the auto industry. This involvement ranges from procurement and trade 
policies and auto specific regulations to indirect measures such as macroeconomic 
policies, highway programs an energy policy (Dyer, 1987).
In the early days, the producers were grateful for the federal support, however in 
1960’s the government began to intervene in industry affairs more actively by 
regulation of safety, emissions and fuel economy. The federal involvement in auto 
industry can be examined in three different stages; from the beginning to Depression 
the government supported the industry by a variety of direct and indirect measures. 
Second from the Depression to 1960’s the government kept a watchful eye on the 
industry’s behavior and during the third stage the government increased its 
involvement and became present in the affairs o f the industiy.
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In the first stage, the government supported the industry in several ways; enormous 
fleet of sales made to the military, post office and other federal agencies with high 
profits. The auto industry’s growth is encouraged by building new roads and putting 
heavy tariff on imported cars. Between World War I and 1950’s foreign penetration 
was avoided by this high rate of taxes for the imported cars.
Federal management of the economy, which escalated in the Depression’s aftermath, 
also affected the auto companies’ behavior and performance. Macroeconomic tools- 
taxes, interest rates, trade policies- and laws regulating the nation’s economic 
performance were not intended to help or hurt the auto industry more than any other. 
In practice, however, federal monetary, tax, trade and energy policies encouraged the 
auto companies’ growth until inflation became a worry in the late 1970’s. The 
government intervened more directly in the auto industry during World War II and 
several times since then by regulating prices and wages. In each period of wage and 
price controls, however, the automakers continued to earn ample returns (Dyer, 1987).
During mid 1960’s the federal intervention became qualitatively different. Before the 
government was antitrust enforcer, industrial relations mediator and macroeconomic 
policy maker; then another role was added; product regulator. The government became 
active and involved in everyday business decisions o f the industry. This new 
government intervention occurred on a massive scale. In 1966, Congress passed the 
National Highway and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, in 1970 the Clean Air Act in 1975 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. Out of these new federal policies came 
hundreds o f specific regulations for the auto industry. Federal policy makers, few of
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them with any expertise in automotive engineering, concerned themselves with the 
details and specifications of product policy, from seat belts to bumpers, from catalytic 
converters to exhaust systems, from engine specifications to material characteristics.
The arguments between political critics o f the auto industry as a ‘sacred cow’ and 
managers who viewed it as ‘ the most important industry in the economic picture of 
the United States’ were replayed in almost identical fashion during the national debates 
on regulation of air pollution and fuel efficiency in the 1970’s (Dyer, 1987).
When we look at Europe auto industry, after World War II, the United Kingdom was 
the strongest and the second largest producer in the World. At that time United 
Kingdom was also the leading exporter o f cars in the World but within a decade the 
British fall behind the Germans in total production. At present the British industry is 
the smallest among the major European producers ranking even below Spain in total 
production. Imports account for nearly 60% of sales in the home market. The foreign 
owned companies, Ford and Vauxhall have captured an increasing share from the 
industry. The lone British owned mass producer British Leyland survived with 
government funding during the past decade.
Between 1948 and 1952, the GNP rose 67 % and industrial production by 110 % in 
West Germany. During 1950’s and 1960’s GNP growth averaged 7.6 % per year 
which is the twice the other European countries. The exports increased from 8.5 % of 
1950 to 15.9 % in 1960. The productivity improved by 7 % per year and 
unemployment and inflation fell to about 1 %. The auto industry played a key role in 
the West German success and production exceeded the prewar peak. Germany passed
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the United Kingdom as Europe’s largest auto producer in the mid 1950’s and became 
the second after the United States. The rapid growth of the German market absorbed 
only part o f the domestic output, from early 1950’s exports to Europe and United 
States accounted for more than 50 % of total production.
As the motor industry developed into an oligopoly, competition among British 
producers never strongly developed. Government intervention didn’t encourage the 
development o f home market and consequently avoided the management’s long term 
plans and investment decisions. As a result industrial relations in Britain was the most 
problematic in Europe with frequent work stoppages and low levels of quality and 
productivity. The shifting macroeconomic policies and conflicting political and social 
agendas of labor and conservative governments played a major role in the industry’s 
decline.
The government intervention had two effects in the development o f the auto industiy. 
First one is that changing macroeconomic policies avoided the growth of the domestic 
market in Britain. Second, successive governments tended to use the auto industry as 
an instrument to achieve larger social goals. For example the government restricted 
demand in order to increase the use of nationalized railroads and public transportation. 
Auto industry was used as a testing ground for social and political reforms.
As recently as a decade ago West Germany was number one. Like the Japan o f the 
early 1980’s Germany boasted an extremely efficient and productive economy. 
Unemployment and inflation stood at insignificant levels, strikes and other forms o f
13
employee unrest were rare. The German reputation for quality and engineering could 
not be reached.
In recent years the picture has not been so bright; the German auto industry is the 
strongest in Europe but its total world production fell from 15.6 % of 1970 to 12.9 % 
at the end of 1980’s.The import penetration o f German market by Japanese jumped 
from 21.1 % in 1977 to 27.2 % in 1988. At the end of 1980’s Ford and GM added 
capacity in places like Spain and Austria and retired production in higher cost areas 
like Germany and Holland.
Volkswagen(VW), the largest automaker in Germany and for many years the national 
economic miracle has passed several financial crisis in the past decade. VW was once 
the low cost producer but now is struggling to control cost, improve quality and 
reorganize manufacturing and marketing on a worldwide basis.
Japanese producers are the dominant players in today’s global auto industry. By the 
early 1980’s however the Japanese producers had become world leaders in building 
high quality cars at low costs. They have set competitive standards that the American 
and European auto companies are hard pressed to match. According to the Changing 
Alliances by Dyer, Japan expressed their institutional purposes, goals and performance 
with six key characteristics. These are;
-Shared Authority and Responsibility, labor and government recognize that 
with authority comes responsibility.
14
-Shared Inleresls, the primary interests of management, government and labor 
are interdependent.
-Efficient, Effective, Economic Decision Making.
-Flexibility and Adaptability, design mechanisms and agreements that permit 
quick adaptation to new circumstances.
-Strategic Thinking, management, government and labor should focus on the 
long term goals to achieve advantage over competitors.
-Focus on the Company in the Global Market, stress the competitive status of 
the company in the world not only in the nation (Dyer, 1987).
These six characteristics o f the Japanese system exhibits a dramatic contrast to the 
American system. In Japanese system the main idea is that, competitive advantage can 
be created through coalition building between management, labor and government.
As can be observed above, the government policies and interventions have played the 
main role during the development o f the world auto industry. The governments who 
have not given the required attention and importance to their auto industries have lost 
the competition power and productivity in the industry which results in decreased 
competition power o f the nation as a whole, like the United Kingdom example.
15
The world auto industry is older than a century and its development can be examined
by dividing it into three main stages. These stages are Craft, Mass and Lean Production
respectively.
•
2.3.1 Craft Production
During 1894 Panhard et Levassor (P&L) was the first auto producer in the world. In 
those years P&L built about a few hundred cars per year. These cars were classically 
hand-made and the work was generally carried by experienced craftsmen. The founders 
of the company Panhard and Levassor talk with the customers, define the 
specifications of the auto demanded and order the necessary parts which are going to 
be assembled. The parts of the car were made by different individual small-scale 
workshops in Paris, then they were assembled into a car in the assembly saloon of 
P&L. The cars were never standard and none o f them resemble each other, every car 
was a different product designed and produced for the demand o f different customers.
Craft Production used simple but flexible tools and produce exactly what the consumer 
wants, but o f course the costs were very high and these costs could not be lowered as 
the production quantities increase, consequently an average consumer could not afford 
to buy craft produced cars.
2.3 Sta2es in World Auto Industry
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The general characteristics o f the craft production are as follows:
-The labor is highly skilled in design, production and assembly, this skill is 
gained by an apprentice period and they become experienced craftsmen.
-The responsibility is highly diversified and the different parts and design o f the 
car are made at different workshops. These workshops belong to different individuals 
and the coordination with the customers are carried out by an entrepreneur like 
Panhard and Levassor in P&L example.
-Simple, flexible, general purpose tools are used in order to process metal and
wood.
-The production capacities are very low, at most a thousand cars per year, and 
about fifty o f those are produced with the same design but no two cars is equal to each 
other as they are hand-made.
-The production costs are very high and as every car produced is a prototype, 
they are not safe and reliable.
The auto industry was transformed into mass production after World War I and P&L 
could not manage to achieve this change and went bankruptcy. But there exist a few 
craft producers in present, these serve to high level, rich customers which prefer to 
order their luxury cars directly to the producers. Aston Martin is an example of these 
craft producers, by producing less than 10 000 cars during the last seventy years. One 
car is produced per one day with highly skilled workers.
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However these eraft producers are forced to make mergers with big firms in order to 
carry out research and development for technology improvements, safety and 
environmental protection. They can not afford the high costs o f research and 
development alone.
2.3.2 Mass Production
Mass Production, as everyone guesses, is not only an assembly line. In fact it is a 
production system in which the different simple parts can be fitted easily and the parts 
can be used interchangeably. This intechangeability can be achieved by using the same 
measuring technique for all the different parts throughout the whole manufacturing 
process. Also the tools are different from the all-purpose flexible tools o f craft 
production.
The simplicity in assembling and interchangeability brings advantages to the mass 
producers and the necessity for the skilled workforce disappeared. As the task does not 
require expertise, the workers are also interchangeable. The time needed for 
assembling a car is also decreased by this production as the worker stands at the same 
point and assembles the part as the body arrives there, also the parts do not need 
smoothing before assembling (Table 1). Consequently, this time decrease gives way to 
high productivity increases as the worker becomes accustomed to these simple and 
easy tasks by practicing many times .
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TABLE 1 Time Differences in Assembling Between Craft and Mass Production
Time for Assembly (Minutes) Craft Production Mass Production
Motor 594 226
Dynamo 20 5
Axis 150 26.5
Source: Womack, J.P.,1990. The Machine That Changed The World, Rawson 
Associates.
Ford’s application o f the assembly line took the attention of other assembler, as the 
new technology did not require high investments. Ford had spent only 3 500 USD for 
the Highland Park assembly line which fastened the production to a great extend and 
decreased the cost of storage of the parts to be assembled. The decrease in the total 
costs were very high when compared to that initial investment. Also the costs 
decreased as the number o f cars produced increase.
When Ford reached to produce 2 million cars per year, the total cost of the car 
decreased by 66 %. The target market was the average consumer and the cars were 
reliable and the maintenance o f them were very easy so that every user can repair the 
car easily.
After World War I, Andre Citroen, Louis Renault, Giovanni Agnelli, Herbert Austin 
and William Morris visited the mass assembly plant in Highland Park and adapted the 
mass production techniques during 1930’s in Dagenham and Köln plants in Europe. In 
the end of 1930’s Volkswagen and Fiat started to make furious plans with mass 
production, but World War II finished civilian production.
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Consequently by 1950’s mass production could be spread to Europe and mass 
produced European cars started to compete with the American ones. So the big three 
American producers. Ford, GM and Chrysler lost the advantage of mass production as 
this type of production became usual worldwide.
If the auto industry of Japan could not have been established, the stable mass 
production in the United States and Europe would have continued towards infinity. 
The development o f Japanese auto industry and application o f lean production by them 
make the other nations to cooperate in this production system not to use competition 
power against Japanese rivals.
2.3.3 Lean Production
Lean production is spreading beyond auto industry and is going to change every 
industry ; choices for consumers, nature o f work and fortune of companies. The most 
basic elements o f lean production are total quality management, just in time and quality 
circles.
It is argued that there is an over capacity crisis in auto industry and the developed 
countries are very close to saturation (Orfeuil and Fournaiu,1983). Whereas this can 
be counter argued that , the world has an acute shortage of competitive lean- 
produetion capacity and a vast glut of uncompetitive mass production capacity 
(Womack, 1990).
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When we try to describe lean production with craft production and mass production, 
the other methods that humans use for production, we see that craft production uses 
highly skilled workers and flexible tools to produce exactly what the consumer wants 
in limited amounts . Whereas in mass production unskilled or semi skilled and 
expensive, single purpose machines are used to produce standardized products in large 
amounts. It is not a surprise that the craft produced goods are very expensive and mass 
produced ones have lower prices.
Lean production combines the advantages o f craft and mass production . The workers 
are multi-skilled and automated machines are flexible which result in producing large 
volumes in enormous variety. Lean production is “ lean”  because it uses less of 
everything compared with mass production- half the human effort in the factory, half 
the manufacturing space, half the investment in tools, half the engineering hours to 
develop a new product. Also, it requires keeping for less than the needed inventoiy on 
site, results in many fewer defects, and produces a greater and ever growing variety of 
products (Womack, 1990).
The goal of the lean production is different from the goals o f the other two. Lean 
producers continually try to decrease costs, achieve zero defects, zero inventories and 
endless product variety. This dream has not yet been reached and endless search of 
excellence continues.
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The developing countries like Turkey should adopt lean production in auto industry in 
order to gain competitive power in the international markets. The lean production 
adopted by TOYOTA-SA which started production in the end o f year 1994.
2.4 W orld Auto M anufacturing Today
The supply and demand in the world auto industry are determined by the developed 
countries. In United States, the big three, Ford, GM and Chrysler produce about 95 % 
of all the production. These producers are no longer competing among themselves but 
there exist a world wide struggle for market shares with rivals in Europe and Japan, the 
top ten manufacturers ranked by 1990 worldwide production are given on Table 2 .
TABLE 2 Top Ten Automotive Manufacturer Companies, 1990.
PASSENGER CARS COMMERCIAL VEHICLES TOTAL
CiM - USA 5 208 221 1 936 335 1 144 556
FORD - USA 3 703 646 1 831 639 5 535 285
TOYOTA-JA1> AN 3 799 921 871 387 4 671 308
NISSAN - JAPAN 2 349 165 716 124 3 065 289
VW-GERMANY 2 873 869 139 063 3 012 932
PEUGEOT CITROEN - FRANCE 2 459 139 241 916 2 701 055
FIAT - ITALY 1 805 449 263 873 2 069 322
RENAULT - FRANCE 1 666 434 321 973 1 988 407
HONDA-JAPAN 1764 775 160 322 1 925 097
CIIRYSI T.R - USA 859 245 954 048 1 813 293
Source: World Motor Vehicle Data, 1992.
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Although there exist a number of well-known specialty producers; Rolls Royce, 
Porsche, Mercedes, BMW and Ferrari and some scaled small producers; Seat, Saab 
and Volvo, the mass market remains quite small and there are six mass producers in 
European auto market, two o f them are multinationals; Ford and GM and four national 
champions; Fiat, Volkswagen, Renault and Peugeot. These are all bunched together, 
with each 11 to 12 % of the market. There is excess capacity but it is very difficult to 
close a plant and to lay workers off in Europe.
The same troubles o f the American auto producers; future o f low growth, intensified 
global rivalry and the need of enormous capital investment are also present for the 
European auto producers.
In Japan, many small producers have cooperated with Toyota and Nissan which supply 
59 % of the Japanese production. Parallel to this centralization, there is a tendency of 
common technology, marketing and production. General Motors and Isuzu, Chrysler 
and Mitsubishi are some examples. The government strives for good relations with 
auto makers and government officials and business leaders in Japan frequently consult 
about major decisions, events and trends before policies are formed. In short, the 
Japanese enterprise system is designed to enhance corporate competitive performance.
The automakers have a central role in the overall economic performance of Japan. The 
eleven vehicle assemblers provide, directly and indirectly to one out o f ten jobs in the 
country. In 1980, Japanese auto industry surpassed the United States as the world’s 
leader in the production o f motor vehicles by producing more than eleven million cars,
23
trucks and busses. Around the world, Japanese auto producers are recognized as the 
industry leaders in both cost and quality. The Japanese can assemble, ship and land in 
America a subcompact car for 1 500 USD less than the American manufacturers to 
build the same car in US. For quality, the Japanese products generally outperformed 
all competitors, according to several industry ratings. In a survey, Japanese cars 
outperformed American and European products in dependability, problem-free 
delivery, fuel economy and value for the money.
The South Korean Auto Industry has displayed considerable developments during the 
last decade. This development has been achieved by using mainly the national 
resources, especially Hyundai has used minor foreign investment and gained 
competition power in the international markets. The Korean auto industi^ is the only 
example among the newly developing countries, that has used minor foreign 
investment. During 1990’s there are five automotive producers in South Korea, among 
the five Hyundai, Daewoo and Kia are producing passenger cars. Hyundai has made 
the management itself but technical support is provided by Mitsubishi, however 
Daewoo has a 50 % GM share. In the year 1990, these three Korean producers have 
produced 986 751 passenger cars and taken place in the top ten world producers 
(Table 3). More than 65 % of this production has been exported.
The United States, United Kingdom, West Germany and Japan provide a range of 
contrast in development, structure and performance. In the past, Japan has risen from 
minor producers to the World’s largest auto producing nation by setting global 
standards in cost and quality. The story of the British auto industry illustrates the 
■opposite example. During 1950’s, United Kingdom had the second largest auto
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industry in the world, after United States, but today it is the weakest in Europe, 
ranking below the production of Spain. West Germany and United States are the cases 
in the middle. The 1990 passenger car production is given on Table 3 .
Before the late 1970’s, relations between labor and management in the British auto 
industry were the most acrimonious and counter-productive in Europe. Frequent 
layoffs and strikes, low productivity, high manning levels, restrictive work practices 
and angry disputes over the introduction o f the new machinery consistently plagued the 
automakers. Between 1969 and 1977, the British auto industry recorded more than ten 
times the national average for lost working days. Between 1955 and 1976, productivity 
in the British auto industry measured by ‘equivalent’ cars produced by employee per 
year increased from 4.1 to 5.5 . At first sight, this increase does not seem bad, but over 
the same years output per worker increased from 3.9 to 7.9 cars in West Germany and 
from 19.8 to 26.1 cars in the United States (Dyer,1987).
TABLE 3 Top Ten Passenger Car Producer Countries, 1990.
COUNTRY PRODUCTION COUNTRY PRODUCTION
JAPAN 9 947 972 SPAIN 1 679 301
UNITED STATES 6 077 449 UNITEDKINGDOM 1 295 611
GERMANY 4 660 657 U.S.S.R 1 259 000
FRANCE 3 294 815 CANADA 1 074 417
ITALY 1 874 672 SOUTH KOREA 986 751
Source: World Motor Vehicle Data, 1992.
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In Western Europe, the producers reacted to international competition by forming 
groups. The purchase o f Audi by Volkswagen in Germany, the merger of Peugeot, 
Citroen and Talbot in France and the cooperation of Fiat with Ford in Italy are some 
examples. In this period the plants became more sophisticated and new scale 
economies are tried to be searched.
There are also important changes in the structure and features o f the automobile. Many 
mechanical parts have left their places for electronic parts and the tendency to use 
computers in cars have increased. Today, robots are used in manufacturing and 
computer aided design (CAD) is used for design in leading auto producing countries. 
These applications also provide improved quality and increased number of models on 
the same production line. Design is one of the most important features of the autos as 
70 % of the total costs result from design, research and development.
The auto industry is experiencing radical changes in technology, production and 
marketing during the last years. These give the governments considerable 
responsibilities, as by the legislation they affect the auto industry both in domestic and 
international scale to a great extend.
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CHAPTER 3
TURKISH AUTO INDUSTRY
3.1 All Outlook to Turkish Economy and fndusti'v
Since 1980, Turkey has been engaged upon a radical transformation o f its economy, 
with the adoption of policies designed to take the country away from its traditional 
closed command status towards that of a truly open economy .
Significant progress in the structural re-adjustment of the economy has been made 
during the past decade and the rapid development of the Turkish economy has resulted 
in an increase in the demand for transportation which increased road transportation 
and demand for autos. However, present levels of high inflation, large budget deficits, 
and a variety of investment and production problems are now the official policy 
makers’ main concerns.
An important development in Turkey’s foreign economic relations in recent years is the 
big increase in foreign capital investment permits issued. As a result, there was a 
significant rise in the number of foreign investors and also in the number o f companies 
which invested foreign capital.
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It may sound strange to evaluate the industrialization as the most important topic of 
the forthcoming ten years, but in fact this is closely related to the system, mechanism, 
mentality and behavior of economy. In Western democracies, competition and supply- 
demand-price trio, which are the main constituents of free market model, always 
develop together with industrialization. Besides, industrialization creates an 
environment for modern entrepreneurship, management style, financial models and 
stock markets (Yıldız, 1992).
Countries that are already industrialized or in the process of industrialization have 
established their automotive industries on the belief that this industry is improving and 
enables the whole economy to improve. Industrialization will be developed under the 
conditions where macro economic policies can create a stable environment. The first 
industry that is mostly affected by macro economic policies is the auto industry. As an 
auto represents a consumer’s second largest lifetime purchase, macro economic 
policies have immediate effect on the automotive industry. Macro economic policies 
are not specifically aimed to discriminate among industries but politically prominent 
industries - like auto industry - are affected more than others.
3.2 Histoi'v and Development of Turkish Auto lndu.stry
The history o f Turkish Auto Industry is shorter compared to World Auto Industry. 
After World War II, during 1950’s Turkey started to develop fastly and gave 
precedence to highway transportation. During that time the demand was met by
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imports. However, the import o f automobiles and other means of transportation caused 
the foreign exchange reserves to decrease which led to the assembly industry of truck, 
jeep and tractor by importing parts.
Automotive industry gained significance in Turkish economy after 1960’s when 
industry changed from assembly to production. During the First Five Year 
Development Plan period, 1963-1967, the automotive industry’s push power in the 
industrialization process was set as the goal and “ Assembly Industry Regulation” 
became effective in 1964. This regulation targeted a domestic production between 50- 
70 % to be achieved by 1969 (Aksoy,1990).
The car “ ANADOL” was assembled in 1966 by OTOSAN from a fiberglass body and 
a Cortina motor. During year 1967 , as GNP per person increases the demand for 
automobile increased sharply. The estimates of the demand was only 8,000, but it 
occurred 21,000, 250 % higher than the estimates. This demand was met by imports 
which reduced foreign exchange reserves. Consequently the Second Five Year 
Development Plan, comprising the period 1968-1972, included the production of 
automobiles in Turkey. By this way the allied industry for automobiles will also 
develop; in order to guarantee this development, the percentage o f domestically 
produced parts in an automobile are forced to increase by the government.
In 1971, the number of auto producers increased to three with the addition o f TOFA$ 
and OYAK-RENAULT. The industry had become the second largest industrial 
employer after textiles.
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The Third Five Year Development Plan, comprising the period 1973-1977, targeted to 
meet the whole demand by domestic production and it was also stated that allied 
industry firms will receive certain incentives if they export their products. In this period 
the auto production and auto stock have shown considerable developments.
During this period, export has been mentioned for the first time. Projects, for 
increasing the capacities of OYAK-RENAULT to 35 000 autos per year and TOFA§ 
to 30 000 autos per year , as well as to increase the domestically produced parts to 85 
% by the mid of the third planned period have stated. It was also stated that both of the 
producers have to export at least 5 % o f their production after they increase their 
capacity (Aksoy,1990).
By the end of 1974 due to rapidly increasing oil prices, the government has decided to 
stop the subsidy for the auto industry. Automotive Industry generally exhibited a 
development trend until the year 1976. But the political instability and economic crisis 
had adversely affected the auto industry which is very sensitive to changes in economic 
conditions. In this period, Turkish economy suffered from the oil crisis and foreign 
exchange bottlenecks which resulted in inflation rates that exceeded 100 %.
The plan to increase export of cars during the fourth five year development plan period 
could not have been realized as the producers produce far below the scale economies. 
The automobile production shown an upward trend until 1976; but after that year until 
1982, entered into a downward trend due to political instability, increasing costs.
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foreign exchange shortages and energy crisis. The production increased after 1982 
continuously.
During all o f the Five Year Plans the main goal was to improve the allied industry and 
to develop integrated firms in the main industry. Consequently increasing the 
proportion of domestically produced parts have received concern without paying 
attention to the product’s quality and price. As a result this proportion is increased to 
90 % on the expense of loosing international standards and quality. Although the 
development of the allied industry was supported, no attempt was made to enable the 
main industry to operate in economies of scale.
The Fifth Five Year Development Plan comprising the period 1984-1988 aimed at 
restructuring the auto industry with allied industry to enable the domestic firms to open 
to foreign competition. However the production growth rate became 3 % and the 
planned structural change was not realized. The firms were still far from competing in 
international markets and producing in economies of scale.
In Turkey, until 1985 there were only slight model changes in the three types of autos 
which were Anadol, Renault 12 and Murat 131. In 1985 OTOSAN has switched from 
Anadol to Taunus and Renault has added Renault 9 to its production line. Then in 
1990, for the first time during 20 years of auto production, products of modern 
technology and large cylinder capacity automobiles are started to being produced in 
Turkey. Some examples are Opel Vectra, Renault 21 and Fiat Tempra. In year 1990, 
General Motors started production of autos in Turkey and took a share of 1 % by 
1,156 passenger cars . The number of producers increased to four.
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In year 1993 OTOSAN gave up producing Taunus and switched to Escort. Renault 
19 was introduced to Turkish consumer by OYAK-RENAULT in 1994. Same year 
GM started producing Opel Astras in Turkey. The economical and technologically 
advanced, small passenger car Uno was produced for the first time in 1994 by TOFA§. 
This car was preferred by Turkish consumers and gained a market share of 5.5 % by 
selling 12,412 units in 1995. TOYOTA-SA produced Corolla 1.3 and 1.6 models in 
1995. The quantities sold are 5,084 and 16,374 respectively. By the end o f 1995 there 
were about 38 different type and model passenger cars being produced in Turkey.
3.3 Cooperation of Turkish Auto Allied Industry with Turkish Auto Industry
One of the most important characteristics o f the auto industry is that, it can easily 
affect many other sectors either in a positive or a negative way. Auto industry plays a 
key role for the whole economy and the manufacturing industry. As an auto is made 
from more than 20,000 different parts and the inputs is supplied from many different 
industries, the developments in the auto industry directly result in developments in tire, 
petrochemicals, glass, plastic, rubber, iron-steel, metals other than iron-steel, electrical 
engines, electronics, optics, control and many other industries.
Generally the auto allied industry produces products that are not produced by the main 
producers, these products may either be end-product or not. The allied industry not 
only provides parts for the main producers but also supplies spare parts for the market. 
As most of the producers use the parts that are produced by the allied industry, there
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exist many firms in the allied industry. These firms can be classified into two types 
according to their size and functions.
The organized big allied industry firms generally work together with the foreign 
partners for license and technical support and sell about 80 % of their products directly 
to the main industry firms. They produce at large quantities and have the ability to 
export. The small unorganized firms are the ones in which the owner is a skilled 
workman supervising the production activity and lack a proper quality control 
department. These smaller firms mainly supply for the spare parts market.
The main problems o f the allied industry in Turkey is the low number of the organized 
large firms which produce high quality products and the low capacity utilization ratios 
which increase directly the unit cost of production. The main reason for the low rate of 
capacity utilization ratios is the low demand from the domestic market for the products 
of the main industry. Consequently the stocks in the allied industry increased sharply.
In developed countries as a result o f the high demand for autos there exist veiy 
powerful allied auto industries. In these developed countries, especially in Japan the 
main producers generally carry out the design o f the car and then assemble the end 
product with the parts and components provided by the allied industry. The 
innovations in the production techniques led to tight relationship and communication 
between the main and allied industry firms and they work together in research and 
development for the new products. As a result o f this tight relation between main and 
allied industry firms, the just in time technique can be applied successfully which 
decreases cost o f storage of the parts dramatically. The communication systems and
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the flexibility in production in the allied industry increase the competition power o f the 
allied industry as well as main industry.
During the last few years, the foreign capital has entered to Turkish auto allied industiy 
as result o f the transformation of the country towards an open economy. Some 
examples are; Sabancı Holding has set up a partnership with Japanese tire producer 
Bridgestone and established Brisa which will export about 2 million tires per year to 
Japan. The ITC Inland Technical Auto Allied Industry, which has a high General 
Motors share has started operation in Bursa by the high technology o f GM.
There are a lot of European companies purchasing materials, parts and services on a 
global basis, and this development will still be progressing in the next few years. 
However a direct supply of European vehicle producers is not feasible, most Turkish 
automotive parts makers can only export to Western Europe, if they work as sub 
contractors for European parts makers and use the marketing channels of them. Some 
international supplier companies like AEG, Bosch, Siemens, Valeo which are 
producing with highest level technology will diversify by investing or shifting their 
plants to other countries to improve their competence in logistics and cost 
management. This also offers chances to Turkish auto allied industry. In order to 
supply products for these international markets; the product should have a standard 
quality, the deliveries should be made on time and the price should be stable.
Another important fact about Turkish auto allied industry is that; about 10 to 30 % of 
the products o f the allied industry can reach the European quality standards and as a
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result Toyota SA company which started in production during the end of 1994 does 
not accept about 80 % o f the allied industry products due to low quality.
According to European Community the transplant products that have about 80 % of 
European content are regarded as European products. So in order to have export 
opportunity, the Japanese transplants - nowadays only Toyota-SA - producing in 
Turkey should at least 80 % Turkish content. In order to achieve this, the Japanese 
firms will also establish their allied industries in Turkey by investing huge amounts of 
capital in the near future.
3.4 Emploviiieiit in Turkish Auto Industry
As the production quantities and the capacity utilization ratios are low the robots are 
not currently used in Turkish Auto Industry. So the employment rate in the industry is 
directly related with the production quantities. As the production increases, the number 
o f employees increase (Table 4 ).
TABLE 4 The Direct Relation Between Production Quantities and Number of 
Employees
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Production 195 574 265 245 348 095 212651 233 412
Employees 21 411 26 784 29 433 21 591 22 114
Source: Demirci, B., 1995. ‘Taşıt Araçları İmalat Sektöründe Gelişmeler ve— ------ — — · --- —-----------7 -- 7 > »
Beklentiler’ , Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası.
DPT, 1991. VI. Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı ÖİK Raporu.
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The auto industry affects many other industries, it also affects the employment in these 
industries. According to some calculations, it is believed every one worker working in 
the main auto industry provides jobs for twenty other workers in the related industries 
(Table 5).
TABLE 5 The Number of Workers in the Auto Related Industries
Worker in tlic main industry 1
Workers in the allied induslries-producing directly to the main industry and spare parts 5 
Workers in tlie maintenance, repair and marketing linns 6
Workers for the maintenance of roads and fuel stations 4
Workers in tlie tourism, banking and insurance firms 4
T O l’AL 20
Source: DPT, 1991 VI. Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı ÖİK Raporu
If we make a calculation by the help o f the above table, we will find out that as the 
number of workers in the main industry was 22,114 during 1995 the sector provided 
jobs for 22,114 times 20 is equal to 442,280 workers.
3.5 The Productivity in Turkish Auto Industi*v
According to the “  Country Profile”  (1990-1991) published by Economic Intelligence 
Unit, Turkish Auto Industry is defined as: Small and inefficient by European and 
World standards, consisting of a large number of competing firms, mostly offshoots of 
international groups and all operating on a relatively small scale. These comments
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bring the argument o f productivity which may be defined in general as the number of 
units produced per worker in one year. Regarding the auto industry where thousands 
of different parts are assembled into a car, defining productivity becomes rather 
complex. Productivity may either be evaluated at each cost center that produces 
specific components or it may also be evaluated at the assembly line where all these 
parts are assembled. When the second definition is applied then the term productivity 
refers either the number of cars produced per worker or the turnover per worker 
(Aksoy,1990).
When we look at productivity rates o f Turkey, we see that the figures are close to the 
developing country standards (Table 6). It is observed that Turkey’s figures are far 
from the worst of Japan and American producers, but better than the worst of 
European producers. This shows that Turkish producers should spend efforts for using 
lean production and increasing productivity.
TABLE 6 The Productivity Figures in different countries compared with Turkish 
Auto Industry
JAPAN U S A EUROPE DliVFiEOPINO CO. TR
Average Worst Average Worst Average Worst Average Woi-sl
PRODUCnVll'Y 16.8 25.9 25.1 30.7 36.2 55.7 41 78.7 42.5
(HOUR/AirrO)
Source: ‘Türk Otomotiv Sanayii Verimlilik Analizi’, TMMOB Makina Mühendisleri 
O dası, November 1993.
The productivity given as number o f cars produced by one worker in a year is 17 in 
Turkey, 25 in France, 40.4 in Sweden, 32 in United Kingdom. Some of the reasons 
behind the low figures o f productivity are the results of mistakes made during the 
selection of capacity and forecasting o f the bottle-necks. As the auto demand is highly
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affected from the changes in the economic conditions, the changes in the economic 
conditions are resulting in a fluctuating capacity utilization ratio in Turkey. There is a 
direct relationship between capacity utilization ratio and productivity . Consequently, 
when the capacity utilization ratio decreases the productivity figures are going down 
(Table 7 ).
TABLE 7 Relation between Capacity Utilization Ratio and Productivity
1993 1994
Capacity Ulilizalion Ratio 118 55
Productivity (Autos/Workcr) 15.4 12.3
Source: Demirci, B., 1995. ‘ Taşıt Araçları İmalat Sektöründe Gelişmeler ve 
Beklentiler’, Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası.
It can be seen from Table 7 that as Capacity Utilization Ratio decreased from 1993 to 
1994 due to low demand, the productivity per worker decreased about 20 % . In order 
to increase productivity in Turkey the production quantities should be increased. For 
this purpose the product should be designed to meet domestic as well as international 
demand. International market is very important for Turkish Auto Industiy, as the 
industry is highly dependent on changing macro economic conditions o f the country. If 
the international demand is met, -when Turkey’s macro economic conditions are 
turbulent- the production quantities would not fell sharply without decreasing 
productivity.
38
3.6 The Competition Power of Turkish Auto Industry
The Auto Industry is very important and always supported in Developed Western 
Countries as it provides production, value added, investment, employment and exports. 
However Turkish Auto Industry is far behind competing with these country’s 
industries.
In auto manufacturing, the most time consuming process is pressing, which is the 
shaping with moulds by use o f high pressure on the steel-sheets. All o f the parts o f the 
autos are prepared first by cutting o f the steel sheets into the required dimensions and 
then pressing these plates into the desired shapes. When changing the moulds the 
presses should be stopped which consumes time and a lot o f money. So it is obvious 
that, producing at higher quantities have cost advantage over the smaller ones. It 
becomes more evident that, the scale o f production in auto manufacturing has a vital 
impact on the cost o f production (Yıldız, 1992),
In Turkey as cost of labor is cheaper when compared to Western countries, it is 
preferred to use limited number of presses and changing the moulds frequently, instead 
of investing on presses. Consequently, the inflexible technology and the equipment that 
require expensive initial investments make it unprofitable to produce at capacities that 
are lower than economies o f scale. As a result it can easily be predicted that the 
Turkish auto manufacturers do not have much chance to compete with the foreign 
manufacturers, unless they reach scale economies (Yıldız, 1992).
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Auto industry also increases technological level of the whole country as well as 
providing value added and employment. High technological level is one o f the most 
basic criteria that determines the competitive power o f a country. So when auto 
industry increases the technological level o f the country, it also increases the country’s 
competitive power in international markets.
As a result o f the high technological developments in the auto industries of the 
developed countries, the technological difference between the newly developing 
countries has increased and hard to compensate. In order to compensate these 
differences, the newly developing countries should give importance to their auto 
industries. Brazil and South Korea has given primary importance for their auto 
industries and succeeded in exporting autos to USA and Europe.
If the necessary importance is not given to the Turkish Auto Industry and side 
industry, in the near future the difference between the developed countries will increase 
and the industry will loose its chance to gain competitive power and increase 
productivity.
Increasing demand - without any doubt - will result in increased production which in 
return will enable the industry to produce in economies o f scale with lower fixed costs. 
The quality will be improved and competition power increase. One alternative to 
increase demand may be producing lower priced, small, up-to-date technology 
passenger cars.
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The demand decreases due to the financial crisis and unstable macro economic 
environment resulted in very low capacity utilization ratios in 1994 and 1995. As a 
result Turkish Auto Industry came far away from its target o f producing in economies 
of scale which is the most important determinant for competition in the international 
markets.
In Turkish Auto Industry, there are already five producers; OTOSAN, TOFAÇ, 
OYAK-RENAULT, GENERAL MOTORS and TOYOTA-SA competing with each 
other. It is known that permissions and subsidies will be provided by the government 
for HONDA, HYUNDAI and MAZDA to open plants and start production in the near 
future. But, unfortunately the current demand in Turkey will not enable all o f these 
producers to produce in economies of scale. However, in World Auto Industry as the 
competition and technology develops rapidly, some mergers take place between 
producers, so that they consolidate their powers together and gain competitiveness by 
producing at larger quantities with lower fixed costs. So permitting and subsidizing 
new firms to start production will be a big mistake as the current demand would not 
utilize this capacity. These new comers will not increase the competitive power o f the 
whole industry but decrease it. As the demand diverges to many different producers, 
no one will produce in economies of scale. In short the number o f producers should 
not be permitted to increase by the government.
The United States is the best example o f this change in the number of auto producers 
with a decrease from 80 companies to 30 by 1930’s and to 9 companies in 1950. And
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after forty years the world demand is mostly provided by 15 leading companies (Table
8).
TABLE 8 Leading Vehicle Producers
COMPANY
GENERAL MOTORS 
FORD 
rOYOTA 
NISSAN 
VOLKSWAGEN 
PElıcil·:oг-cгrROl·:N 
CHRYSLER 
RI'NAULT 
r iA 'l  
HONDA 
MAZDA 
MITSUBISHI 
SUZUKI
DAIMLIHMII'NZ
DAIHATSU
Source: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association o f the United States, 'World Motor 
Vehicle Data’ , 1992 Edition.
3.7 Demand and Capacity Growths in Turkish Auto riidustry in 1990^s
In the Sixth Five Year Development Plan, comprising the period o f 1990-1994, a 12.6 
% growth in the demand for automotive is estimated. Also a 20.6 % increase in the 
export is planned. Production is planned to have a 13 % annual increase to match the 
estimated increase in demand and developments in export (Altıncı Beş Yıllık Kalkınma 
Planı,1991).
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In 1991, an economic recession took place in the developed countries. Apart from that 
the political and economical instability, due to the Gulf War, affected the production, 
investment and costs in a negative way. The strikes and high wage increases have 
increased the cost o f production and the economic growth rate became 0.3 % although 
it was estimated to be 5.9 %. In such a turbulent economic environment the auto 
industry has shown a 17 % increase in production and 6 % increase in exports; also the 
capacity utilization ratio increased 10 points and reached to 81% (Table 9 ). These 
increases indicate that the auto industry continues its development stage without being 
heavily affected by the recession in the whole economy.
TABLE 9 Capacity Utilization Ratios in Turkish Auto Industry
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
C.U.R.(Percent) 81 102 118 55 54
Source: 1991-1992; Demirci, B., 1993. ‘Taşıt Araçları İmalat Sanayiinde Gelişmeler 
ve Beklentiler’, Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası.
1993-1994: Demirci, B., 1995. ‘Taşıt Araçları İmalat Sektöründe Gelişmeler 
ve Beklentiler’, Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası.
1995: Calculated by the data provided in ‘Automotive Industry Reports’, 
December 1995, Koç Holding A.Ş. Yönetim Bilgi Sistemleri Koordinatörlüğü.
The manufacturing industry had a big share for the economic growth rate becoming 
5.9 % in 1992. The value added by manufacturing industry in 1991 was 3 % whereas it 
became 7 % in 1992 which also increased GNP. The auto industry has also shown a 
35 % production increase in 1992 compared to 1991. Consequently, the production 
capacities in auto industry were increased to 260 000 units (Table 10 ). In 1992 the 
auto industry’s -including the allied industry- share in the whole manufacturing 
industry increased from 8.9 % to 11.9 %. Both exports and imports have increased in
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this year. The share o f exports in the whole manufacturing industry increased from 2.4 
to 3.1 %.
TABLE 10 Production Capacity Increases in Turkish Auto Industry
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Capacity(Units) 240 000 260 000 295 000 395 000 416 000
Source 1991-1992; Demirci, B., 1993. ‘Taşıt Araçları İmalat Sanayiinde
Gelişmeler ve Beklentiler’, Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası.
1993-1994; Demirci, B., 1995. ‘Taşıt Araçları İmalat Sektöründe Gelişmeler 
ve Beklentiler’, Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası.
1995: Calculated by the data provided in ‘Automotive Industry Reports’, 
December 1995, Koç Holding A.Ş. Yönetim Bilgi Sistemleri Koordinatörlüğü.
During 1992 demand from the domestic market continued to act as a key for 
production and investment decisions for the sector. The Turkish Auto Industiy has a 
structure which generally supplies to the domestic market. As a result the industry can 
easily be affected by either positive or negative events that occur in the macro- 
economical scale.
In 1993, the increasing trend for the demand in auto industry continued and the 
production of autos increased about 31 % and reached 348,095 units (Table 11). The 
capacity o f the whole industry was expanded about 13 % parallel to the increase in 
demand. The capacity utilization ratio in the industry increased to 118 % from 102 % 
o f 1992 (Table 9).
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TABLE 11 Production Quantities in Turkish Auto Industry
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Production(Units) 195 574 265 245 348 095 212 651 233 412
Source: 1991-1992: Demirci, B., 1993. ‘Taşıt Araçları İmalat Sanayiinde
Gelişmeler ve Beklentiler’, Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası.
1993-1994: Demirci, B., 1995. ‘Taşıt Araçları İmalat Sektöründe 
Gelişmeler ve Beklentiler’, Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası.
1995: Calculated by the data provided in ‘Automotive Industry 
Reports’, December 1995, Koç Holding A.Ş. Yönetim Bilgi Sistemleri 
Koordinatörlüğü.
In the second half of the 1993, current accounts and foreign trade deficits increased. 
There was excess liquidity and Turkish Lira started to depreciate. As the current 
accounts deficits were high and the country risk increased in international markets, 
there existed some difficulty in providing credits abroad.
Consequently, in January 1994 Moody’s and Standard and Poors decreased the credit 
rating o f Turkey and the financial crisis began. The largest economic recession of the 
last fifty years took place in Turkish Economy in 1994.
The financial crisis, economic bottlenecks and 5**’ April Economic Precautionary 
Package has changed the trend for the demand in the Auto Industry to reverse. As 
generally the industry produced for the domestic market and the exports were low, this 
crisis was tried to be passed by laying off employees and decreasing capacity utilization 
ratios. The capacity utilization ratio occurred as 54 % in this year (Table 9 ). The total 
capacity has been expanded by 100 000 units than 1993, but unfortunately the demand 
fell sharply and the production had to be decreased.
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In real terms, the sector that has mostly been affected by the financial crisis of 1994 
was the investment commodities. This investment commodities also include the autos 
in turkey. The production o f investment commodities decreased about 22 % in 1994 
and their share in the GNP fell from 15 % to 12 %. However production o f investment 
commodities decreased by 22 %, the production o f auto industry fell about 41 % and 
production quantity fell to 1991 levels. As a result Turkish Auto Industry is the sector 
which has been mostly affected by the financial crisis in 1994.
The negative effects of the financial crisis of 1994 and the economical precautionary 
package has continued on the Turkish Auto Industry during 1995 as well. The auto 
production showed a very slight increase -about 10 %- in 1995 compared to 1994, but 
as the total capacity in the industry also increased the capacity utilization ratio 
decreased (Table 9) .The production is about 67 % of 1993 production level.
This year TOYOTA - SA started producing passenger cars with a partnership o f 
Japanese Toyota and Sabancı. The share of TOYOTA - SA in the whole passenger car 
market became about 9 % with 21,458 passenger cars (Table 12 ). It can be seen from 
table that TOFAŞ was the leader in the industry during the last ten year period.
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TABLE 12 Production and Shares by Make of Passenger Cars in Turkey
P R O D U C E R 1986 198 7 1988 198 9 1990 1991 1992 1993 199 4 1995
Ciaicral M otors
V olu m e 1156 6 5 2 8 9 3 6 3 12093 6 6 2 6 7681
P crca itage 1 3 4 3 3 3
O T O S A N
V olu m e 6 9 7 3 1 0 3 7 8 11 5 9 2 6 1 4 0 7 7 3 7 267 1 2 9 8 0 2 2 5 6 6 0 0 8 8 5 4 3
P erea itage 9 10 10 5 5 1 1 1 3 4
O yak-R eiiault
V olum e 3 2 9 4 3 4 3 0 5 7 4 9 4 1 6 5 1 7 8 2 7 0 0 6 0 7 8 9 9 4 1 1 0 6 5 9 1 3 3 0 0 6 7 8 0 6 7 7 4 8 6 2
P erca itage 40 40 41 4 4 4 2 4 0 42 3 8 3 7 32
T O F A S
V olu m e 4 2 1 1 6 5 4 5 9 6 6 0 0 1 8 6 0 3 9 3 8 8 4 1 3 10 7 3 8 1422 4 3 2 0 0 7 4 0 1 2 1 9 5 0 1 2 0 8 6 8
P erca itage 51 51 50 51 53 55 54 58 57 52
'rO Y O T A S A
V olu m e 2 1 4 5 8
P erea ilage 9
Source; Calculated by the data provided in ‘Automotive Industry Reports’, December 
1995, Koç Holding A.Ş. Yönetim Bilgi Sistemleri Koordinatörlüğü.
3.8 The Effects of Governm ent Policies for Turkish Auto Industry
Turkish Auto Industry is young when compared with World Auto Industry, but there 
are some countries which started to develop their auto industries at the same time with 
Turkey but surpassed Turkish Auto Industry. The main reason for this rapid
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development is the stable government policies towards auto industries and government 
support for the auto industry.
One example for these countries is Spain. The government forced the domestic 
producers to increase the percentage of the domestically produced parts in an auto and 
wanted the producers to export about 65 % of their production. Also they protected 
their domestic auto industry from rivalry for seven years after being a member of the 
European Community.
South Korea is another example in which the government policies managed to create a 
successful auto industry in the worldwide scale. Total production was about 122,000 
during 1983 but today it has been enlarged by about ten times. For this success the 
main part belongs to the governments stated decisions;
-A priority is given for the automotive industry as a sector which will bring 
industrialization for the whole country.
-A long term and stable master plan is prepared for the auto industiy.
-The auto allied industry is encouraged to develop.
-The number o f the producers are limited in number.
-The auto imports are limited.
The Turkish Government should also take some decisions in order to encourage the 
development o f the auto industry. Some of the government policies might be as 
follows;
-The taxes for the products of the auto industry should be decreased.
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-Second-hand auto imports should strictly be banned.
-Import o f the new autos should be arranged according to model, type and 
origin country.
- Minimum export requirement should be brought for the new investments that 
have foreign share.
-A minimum domestically produced part usage must be brought in order to 
support allied industry.
-The energy prices should not be increased continually.
-The export restrictions in the license agreements should not be permitted.
-The instruments and tools for the quality control should be imported duty free. 
-The decisions about the industry should be taken together with the 
representatives from the auto industry.
-The government subsidies should not be provided for the firms but to the 
sector as a whole.
-In the public auto purchases the priority should be given for the domestic
firms.
Implementation o f these policies would help the development o f the domestic auto 
industry, but strict control over the producers should be taken so that they should not 
only take the advantage o f these protectionist decisions and do not help to develop a 
strong auto industry which will compete in the international markets and export 
products.
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Turkey’s development strategy for the near future is capital intensive, competitive and 
highly technological model. In the near future, competition in the domestic and 
international market will continue to increase; consequently the firms should produce 
in economies o f scale with highly developed technology. Huge investments are needed 
for the industry to reach that technology, but amortization o f the investment is not easy 
as the current domestic and international demand are not high in quantity. So, first of 
all the domestic demand should be strengthened so that these investments for the 
development of Turkish Auto Industry would be feasible.
When we compare the figures of people that fall per one auto in the World with 
Turkey, it can be easily observed that there already exists high demand potential in 
Turkey (Table 13 ). This high demand potential can not be transformed into real 
demand due to various factors.
TABLE 13 The number of People Falling to One Auto in Different Countries, 1990
3.9 Factors that Affect Demand in Turkish Auto industry
COUNTRY PEOPLE/AUTO COUNl'RY PEOPLE/AUTO
AUSTRIA 2.6 PORTUGAL 7.1
BULGARIA 7.3 SPAIN 3.5
DENMARK 3.2 SWITZERLAND 2.3
FINLAND 2.6 UNITED KINGDOM 2.6
FRANCE 2.4 YUGOSLAVIA 7.4
GERMANY 2.3 RUSSIA 23
GREF'CE 6.3 CANADA 2.1
HUNGAin' 6.1 USA 1.7
IRELAND 4.6 MEXICA 14
ITALY 2.4 TURKEY 3Î)
Source; Demirci, B., 1993 ‘Taşıt Araçlan imalat Sanayiinde Gelişmeler ve Beklentiler’, 
Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası.
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Macroeconomic policies - the mix o f monetary, fiscal and trade policies - have 
immediate and obvious effects on the automotive market. Because a car normally 
represents a consumer’s second largest lifetime purchase (after a house), interest rates 
have a disproportionate impact on demand (Dyer, 1987).
As a result o f the lack o f stable, unturbulent macro economic environment in Turkey, 
the investment, production and export decisions can not be taken effectively. When a 
stable macro economic environment is established, the income grov/th for the citizens 
would also become stable. The demand for autos tends to be responsive for income 
growth. As the personal ineome o f the consumers grow, the demand also grows 
(Table 14) . In an high inflationary, unstable macro economic environment the real 
incomes decrease, interest rates increase and the re-payment periods decrease. In such 
an environment instead of borrowing money and purchasing autos (consumer credits), 
the consumers prefer to lend money. An inverse relationship between the rate of 
interest on savings and time deposits and the demand for autos exist as people tend to 
save more when the interest rates increase. Starting from February 1994, the high 
inflation factor played an important role in Turkish economy and the sales o f autos 
decreased leaving high stocks. Consequently, the production had to be terminated from 
time to time so that, these high level o f stocks could be decreased.
Macroeconomie policies, by definition are not supposed to discriminate among 
industries, although in practice large, politically prominent industries such as autos are 
hurt or helped more than others (Dyer, 1987) .
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TABLE 14 The Direct Relation Between Autos per 1 000 Person and GNP per 
_____________Capita, 1990____________________________________________
COUNTRY AUTOS PER 1 000 PERSON GNP PER CAPITA(DOLLARS)
GERMANY
FRANCE
UNITED KINGDOM 
HOLLAND 
SPAIN 
IRELAND 
GREECE 
TURKEY
483
405
379
358
286
226
154
46
18212 
17 376 
15 882 
15 708 
11 738 
10 627 
7 323 
3 318
Source; International Automotive Review, 1994.
Another reason for the potential demand not being transformed into real demand is the 
high rate of taxes which increase the price o f the passenger cars. The average price of 
an auto affects the demand to a great extend. According to the demand theory, the 
price is known to be negatively associated with demand. In other words, it is expected 
that as the price increases the demand for autos should decrease unless the commodity 
is an inferior good. The taxes that directly affect the auto prices are; Value Added Tax, 
Auto Purchase Tax, Additional Auto Purchase Tax, Environment Pollution Fund and 
Motor Vehicle Tax. The taxes are the highest among various countries which act as a 
barrier against demand and production increases (Table 15 ). The significance of these 
taxes against demand increases can be seen in July 1994; when the Additional Auto 
Purchase Tax decreased from 12 to 6 %, some real increases in the demand took place.
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TABLE 15 The Taxes that Directly Affect the Prices of Autos in Turkey compared 
with other Western Countries
COUNTRIKS TAXKS(1>ERCENT)
UliLGlUM 25.0
I'RANCE 25.0
UNITl·;!) KlN(iI)OM 24.6
PORTIJGAL 22.4
n'ALY 19.0
110LL;\ND 18.5
GICRMANY 14.0
SWITZERLAND 8.0
rUKKEY 40-70
Source: OSD Reports
Apart from the high level o f these taxes the system is very complex and time 
consuming. By a research carried out by OSD it is found out that, when the total taxes 
on the auto prices decreased by 20 %, the demand will be increased by 37 % in year 
1997. The loss that will occur by decreasing these taxes will be compensated as the 
total demand increases.
But unfortunately, instead o f decreasing these taxes government preferred to increase 
them and by January 1996 the Additional Auto Purchase Tax increased to 18 % from 
12 for autos that have a cylinder capacity o f 1600 to 2000 cc. and to 24 % for larger 
than 2000 cc. , the value added tax is also increased to 40 % from 23 for cylinder 
capacities larger than 2000cc. These increases have very large impact on the 
decreasing demand in Turkish Auto Industry.
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Consumer credits, which started in the second half o f 1989, had a significant effect on 
the demand increase for auto sales by increasing the purchasing power of the consumer 
(Table 16 ). Between 1989-1994 3,448,063 consumers used consumer credits and 41 
% of these credits were used for purchasing autos. A positive relationship is expected 
between auto demand and the credit availability.
TABLE 16 Relation between Auto Sales and Consumer Credits
Number of Credits Auto Sales Share of Credits (Percent)
1990 60.942 2.34,199 26
1991 33,667 223,476 15
1992 137.456 309,294 44
1993 184.393 442,859 42
1994 21.032 225,314 9
Source: Statistics o f Association of Banks
These credits have decreased in 1994, because due to the financial crisis the interest 
rates increased and re-payment periods decreased. As a result, an average consumer 
could not afford to take credits and the sales fell sharply. Also the Value Added Tax is 
taken from the installments as well in other words the consumer is forced to pay for 
the interest which increase the price of the auto.
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3.9.1 Results of the Regression Analysis
Regression analysis, which is a least squares estimation technique, is used in estimating 
the production quantities of autos in Turkey. The analysis is based on the annual time- 
series data covering the period o f 1979-1995. Microsoft Excel is used in the regression 
analysis and both single and multiple regression have been carried out for estimating 
the relative significance o f the independent variables, namely annual inflation rates, 
deflated price o f autos, annual interest rates and GNP per capita. Two different 
multiple regression equations have been found out; in the first one the dependent 
variable is the annual auto stock in the country that falls to a thousand people and in 
the second one the annual production quantities o f autos appeared as the dependent 
variable. The data for the variables of the regressions are given in Appendix A and the 
outputs o f the Excel are in the Appendix В o f this thesis.
The import duties on autos are also considered to be an important independent 
variable, but due to the unavailability o f appropriate statistics it could not be included 
in the regression analysis. This was due to the fact that import o f autos were not 
allowed unless a worker’s permit is issued. After 1984 there had been a serious change 
in the import regime and import o f autos were allowed. But the regulations are still not 
stable and there are changes in custom duties every time which makes it impossible to 
have time series data o f this variable.
According to the results, when we regress the autos per 1,000 people in Turkey with 
inflation rate it can be observed that autos per 1,000 person varies inversely with the
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inflation as it has been stated in this section. The Adjusted R Square, that is the 
adjusted coefficient determination showing the explanatory power o f the equation, 
indicates that 53 % o f the variations in the dependent variable, autos per 1,000 person, 
can be explained by the independent variable, annual inflation rates. The single 
regression equation is as follows;
Y= 13.77-0.222313 X where.
Y is the autos per 1,000 person 
X is the annual inflation rates
The coefficient of the independent variable is -0.222313 which means that as inflation 
rises by 1 point, the autos per 1,000 person will decrease by 0.222313.
When the autos per 1,000 person is regressed with the average deflated price of an 
auto, we found out that the Adjusted R Square is 40 %, which indicates that these 
variations can be explained by the average deflated price changes. The single 
regression equation is as follows;
Y= 19.289-0.021192 X where.
Y is the autos per 1,000 person 
X is the average deflated price of an auto
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The coefficient of the independent variable is found as -0.021192. As the deflated 
average auto price increase by one unit the autos per 1,000 person decrease by a 
quantity of 0.021192.
The interest rates also have an inverse relation with the total auto stock and 72 % of 
the changes in the autos per 1,000 person can be explained by the changes in interest 
rates. The single regression equation is as follows;
Y= 4.818 -0.38297011 X, where.
Y is the autos per 1,000 person 
X is the annual interest rates
As the interest rates increase by one point, the autos per 1,000 person will decrease by 
0.38297011.
Only income growth has a direct relation with the autos per 1,000 person. About 65 % 
of the changes in the autos can be explained by GNP per capita increases. The single 
regression equation is as follows;
Y = . 3.748 + 0.015726573 where,
Y is the autos per 1,000 person 
X is the GNP per capita in USD
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When the GNP per capita increase by one unit in dollar terms, the autos per 1,000 
person will increase by 0.015726573.
A multiple regression analysis including all these four variables in only one equation 
was also performed, in which the Adjusted R square was 91 % and the output equation 
occurred as;
Y = .11 37452455 -0.031469721 XI -0 .013577X 2-0.28551 X3 + 0.009697 X4
Y is the autos per 1,000 person
XI is the annual inflation rates
X2 is the average deflated price o f an auto
X3 is the annual interest rates
X4 is the GNP per capita in dollars
The result o f the multiple regression equation is also in accordance with the single 
regression equations and the overall effect of the four different variables can be 
estimated by putting the actual values of these variables in this equation.
Another multiple regression equation has also been carried out in which all 
independent variables are same as the first multiple regression but only the dependent 
variable changed as the annual production quantities of autos. The Adjusted R-Square 
is found out to be 87 % and the equation is as follows;
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Y = -100537.6386-214.441 XI -238.192 X2 - 117.231 X3 - 131. 312X4
Y is the annual production quantities o f autos
XI is the annual inflation rates
X2 is the average deflated price o f an auto
X3 is the annual interest rates
X4 is the GNP per capita in dollar terms
The producer firms can forecast the ftiture production quantities for autos when they 
have the available data about the independent variables of the coming year. By the help 
o f these figures the investment decisions can be made easier. Also the producer firms 
can also adjust their prices so that the production quantities can be increased.
However, in Turkey, the result o f these equations can not be so distinct as the demand 
fluctuations generally occur due to many different decision changes about auto 
industry o f the different governments. As there is no master plan for the Turkish Auto 
Industry, regulation changes overnight always take place which directly result in 
demand fluctuations.
Also, these factors are not the only ones which affect the demand for autos. Factors 
such as; occupations, geographical location, the increase in population, improvements 
in standards o f living, the psychological atmosphere whether optimistic or pessimistic, 
fashion, personal interest and love towards autos, showing off, the autos place in the
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public and the level o f activities of the business firm sector might be expected to 
influence the demand for autos.
3.10 International Trade in Turkish Auto Industry
International trade in Turkish Auto was not so well developed until 1990’s, the import 
and export quantities were close to each other from 1982 to 1989. But due to 
decreases in tariff for imported autos in the end of 1989, the import of autos increased 
sharply and export import ratio fall to 8 % and this trend was observed until 1994. In 
this year due to the financial crisis and depreciation o f Turkish Lira, imports fell which 
continued through 1995.
3.10.1 Exports
Until 1980’s, the exports in Turkish Auto Industry was negligible. In 1981 the exports 
comprise about 5 % o f the whole manufacturing industry exports. The exports of 
autos between 1982-1990 are given (Table 17).
TABLE 17 The Auto Exports between 1982-1990
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Auto E.xporls 3,967 3,343 3,888 3,760 4,997 4,987 6,102 8,220 5,598
(UniLs)
Source: OSD
60
Although the figures are quite high, they do not represent the real exports as they 
include the exports to Republic o f Northern Cyprus and the government subsidized 
autos sold in the domestic market (Ünsal,1989). Other countries that exports took 
place during this period were Egypt, Tunusia, Libya and Irac.
During this plan period as well as the previous ones, there will be no expectations for 
exporting large quantities o f autos to European Community Countries; but if 
subsidized and supported by the license companies side-industry products can be 
exported (Altıncı Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Plam ÖİK Raporu).
TABLE 18 The Auto Exports between 1991-1995
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Aulo E.xporls (Units) 5,790 8,996 6,846 12,802 12,200
Sourcc; Demirci, B., 1995. ‘Taşıt Araçları imalat Setöründe Gelişmeler vc 
Beklentiler’, Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası.
In year 1992, exports o f autos showed an increase o f 55 % (Table 18 ). 58 % of 
Automotive Industry Export were autos, but 65 % o f the automotive exports were 
government subsidized products sold in the domestic market. The exports in the 
automotive industry comprise only 22 % o f imports during this year.
During 1994 due to the devaluation and shrinkage o f domestic demand, exports 
started to increase. The total country exports increased 18 % compared to 1993. The 
auto exports in units increased about 87 %.
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Another development in this year was the expansion in the number of countries where 
exports took place. As the domestic demand fell sharply in 1994, the producers started 
to find out new markets. Consequently, 42 % of exports o f the automotive industry 
were made to European Community countries and rest to 49 other countries. The 
exports in automotive industry increased to 40 % o f imports in this year. However the 
exports are very low in quantity when we compare them with the total capacity of 
Turkish Auto Industry. In 1994, the total capacity was 395,000 units and the total auto 
exports were only 12,802 ; only 3 % of the capacity.
In order to be able to increase the capacity utilization ratio and decrease fixed costs, 
the producers need to concentrate on export which is very low for the time being. 
Even the Western manufacturers that are producing at scale economies, but supplying 
only to the domestic problems, face problems when there is a tightening of demand in 
the domestic market. Whereas manufacturers that export large quantities of cars do not 
come up with problems of profitability, productivity and competitiveness even if there 
is a decrease in domestic demand. Therefore, the manufacturers should always 
concentrate on export markets in order to overcome the insufficient demand periods in 
the domestic market.
3.10.2 Imports
In Turkey, sometimes the import duties change two or three times a year. As there is 
no a ‘master plan’ for the automotive industry, the producers face uncertainty. The
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automobile producers generally base their program on five years, but in Turkey, due to 
the uncertainty in the auto industry they cannot make reliable predictions o f the future 
(Otomotiv Sanayii’ nden Haberler, April 1991).
Before 1980’s there were high custom tariffs and quotas which acted as barriers 
against imported autos. The tariff for autos was about 75 % o f the price in 1983. The 
quotas was expanded in 1984 and the export quantities started to increase - especially 
for the second hand autos - and reached 8,849 units (Table 19 ). During 1984 and 
1985 Turkish Auto Industry had been affected negatively by the second hand imports.
TABLE 19 The Auto Imports between 1982-1990
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Auto Imports 2,795 3,219 8,849 12,806 6,975 5,115 4,655 7,094 65,390
(Units)
Source: OSD
But in 1986 in order to avoid second hand imports, the after sales service must for the 
importers brought by the government and imports decreased.
During 1986-1989 although the tariffs had been lowered and imports unrestricted, the 
domestic autos were preferred by the Turkish consumer as the prices were lower and 
after sales services were more reliable (Altıncı Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı ÖİK Raporu).
By the end of 1989 the custom duties and taxes were reduced to be in harmony with 
the European Community. As soon as the imported auto prices fell about 8 to 20 %, a
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boom in the purchase o f imported autos was observed . The sales increased from 7,094 
o f 1989 to 65,390 in 1990 (Table 19 ). This sudden increase brought its problems with 
it. In fact foreign competition was needed in Turkey to force domestic producers 
improve quality and reduce selling prices, but the import regime should be made on a 
program within a specified period. It should also be noted that about 40 % o f the 
import has been made from the Eastern Block Countries and about 30 % from Japan 
(Otomotiv Sanayii’nden Haberler, October 1989).
In 1991, due to the economic recession in the world and the economical and political 
uncertainties resulting from the Gulf War, import o f autos has decreased (Table 20 ).
TABLE 20 The Auto Imports between 1991-1995
199! 1992 1993 1994 1995
Auto Imports 33,692 53,045 101,610 25,465 25,700
(Units)
--------------------- -------? ----- · ?  --------------- --- --------T  " ------------- J ------------  ----------------------
Beklentiler’, Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası.
As a result o f the vigor due to the production increase in the country, the total demand 
as well total imports have increased during 1992. The share of auto imports in the total 
automotive imports have increased from 72 % o f 1991 to 73. The percentage shares of 
countries that automotive imports have taken place during 1991 - 1994 are given on 
Table 21 .
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TABLE 21 Share o f Countries in Automotive Imports
COUNTRIES 1991 1992 1993 1994
JAPAN 42 37 25 17
GERMANY 29 26 21 37
RUSSIA 10 13 39 24
SOUTH KOREA 6 5 9 14
OTHER 45 COUNTRY 13 19 6 8
Source: Bulletin o f Agents o f Imported Autos Association.
In year 1993, due to the reasons like ; economical growth, nominal prevention ratio 
decreases, credits by foreign countries and decreases in prices o f imported autos- 
because of recession in OECD countries- had resulted in an increase of 95 % for 
demand of imported autos. The imported auto quantity reached a peak point during 
this year (Table 20 ).
However Turkish Lira depreciation lead to price increases in 1994 and lack of foreign 
credits decreased the demand for the imported autos sharply. The same trend 
continued in 1995.
3.11 The Position of Turkish Auto Industry After Customs Union A2reemciit
The Customs Union Agreement has been signed on 6‘*' March 1995 as a consequence 
of Ankara Agreement which was signed on 1“* December 1964 and Additional Protocol
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on r ‘ January 1973. By this agreement Turkey entered Customs Union on 1*^ January 
1996.
The decisions that was taken on this agreement about Turkish Auto Industry are as 
follows;
- Although the time is not strictly determined, about ten years the second -hand 
auto imports will not be allowed to enter Turkish auto market.
- The tariff rates for autos coming outside EC Countries will not be changed 
until year 2 001.
-A five year period is given for Turkey to be in harmony with the technical 
specifications of EC.
By the 6“' March Agreement the factors that carry risk for Turkish Auto Industry has 
been avoided and second-hand imports was banned for ten years.
The six of sixteen countries that constitute EC are the ones that take place in the first 
ten auto producing nations on the world. In 1995 these six countries have produced 
about 42 % of world auto production (Table 2 2 ) .
TABLE 22 The share o f EC countries in the World Auto Production
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
SHARE(PERCENT) 43 44 45 41 41 42
Source: International Automotive Review, 1994.
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Turkey’s auto production was the highest in 1993 with 348 000 units which was higher 
than Sweden and Belgium. But in 1994, due to the financial crisis the production fell 
sharply. The 1994 production quantities are given on Table 23 .
TABLE 23 Auto Production Quantities o f EC Countries, 1994
COUNTRY AUTO PRODUCTION( 1 000 UNITS)
GERMANY .1 750
FRANCE 2 895
UNITED KINGDOM 1 450
ITALY I 275
SPAIN I 530
SWEDEN 300
BELGIUM 347
HOLLAND 80
AUSTRIA 41
TURKEY 213
Source: International Automotive Review, 1994.
The Turkish Auto Industry has low competition power in the international markets due 
to some structural problems. The financial crisis and the recession have also weakened 
industry’s competition power. Some o f the structural problems of Turkish Auto 
industry against EC countries are as follows:
-The production capacities of the producers are generally far from producing in 
economies o f scale.
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-The current and short term domestic demand will not be enough to amortize 
the investments that will be made to enlarge the current capacities and renewal of the 
technologies.
-The macro economical developments in the country result in the decrease o f 
auto demand and investment decisions o f the producers. Consequently, producing in 
economies of scale- which is the most determinant o f the international competition- 
can not be achieved.
-Although the labor costs are lower in Turkey compared to EC countries; the 
productivity figures are about half o f EC countries. As the productivity figures are low 
in Turkey, an average auto is produced at 10-20 % higher costs.
As a summary when scale of production, productivity, cost o f production and quality 
are taken into consideration, we may say that competing in international markets for 
Turkish Auto Industry is not easy. However, the industry has been in a dynamic 
development period until 1990’s in order to solve the problems stated above. For this 
purpose the capacities are being enlarged, new model production and modernization 
investments are being made, total quality management is tried to be applied and 
product qualities are tried to be increased.
The cost o f import autos for the importers from EC countries decrease about 24-37 % 
and consequently the share of them will increase in the domestic market. The cost of 
imports from other countries will not be decreased as the prevention will continue until 
2001. But as the prices o f autos from Eastern Europe and South Eastern Asian 
countries are not high, their market share will not be decreased to a great extend.
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The big chance for Turkish Auto Industry is that; by 6“' March Customs Union 
Agreement their strongest rivals ‘the second hand auto imports’ will not be allowed to 
enter Turkish market for ten years period. However this ten year period is not strictly 
determined, and the European Community Countries may force Turkish Government 
to shorten this period as second-hand imports will be very beneficial for them. This 
period should be made distinct so that no shortening can be made in the future.
It is known that World Auto Industry is controlled by some multinational companies 
and the producers that do not integrate with them can not compete in the international 
arena (Demirci,1995). All o f the five producers in Turkey have foreign investment 
shares; GM has a 100 %, Oyak-Renault has 57 %, Toyotasa has 50 %, Tofa§ has 42 % 
and Otosan has 30 % foreign shares. These producers should determine strategies with 
their foreign partners and provide expertise on some specific model so that they can 
reach to international markets with these specific models by the help of their foreign 
partners.
It is predicted that in a few years time period there will be important structural changes 
in the both Turkish Auto Industry and Allied Industry. The number o f producers will 
be decreased and the remaining ones will produce in economies o f scale with higher 
technologies. So the producers which invest for plants with higher technologies will 
survive.
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3.12 The Probable Effects of the New Duty - Free Import Policy for Second- 
Hand Autos
The duty free imports were allowed for only autos until 1984, then trucks and busses 
were also allowed. By 1985 more than 6,300 second-hand autos, busses and trucks, 
which had finished economical operating life, imported to Turkey. This was a very 
heavy load for the Turkish economy (Altıncı Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Plam ÖİK Raporu , 
1991).
There were no any spare parts and after sale services available for these imported 
autos. These imports made Turkish Automotive Industry - especially for the 
commercial vehicles- enter a crisis. The share o f the tariffs that come to the treasury 
from these second-hand autos were also very low and the Turkish Auto Industry was 
forced to compete with these imports. So these duty free second hand imports were 
not allowed anymore during The Sixth Five Year Plan Period (Altıncı Beş Yıllık 
Kalkınma Plam ÖİK Raporu, 1991).
In July 1996, the Government has confirmed that Turkish people working abroad will 
have a permission to import duty free autos. By this confirmation Turkish Auto 
Industry has lost the advantage o f 6* March 1995 Customs Union Agreement which 
avoids second-hand imports for ten years period. The conditions will be investing 
50,000 DM in a one year time deposit account at a specified interest rate o f 11 % and 
the car should be 0 to 5 years o f age.
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The Auto Industry and the Employee Syndicates have shown a very severe reaction 
towards this decision and told that Turkey will again be a graveyard for the imported 
second hand autos like the one in 1985 if this confirmation is accepted (Milliyet, 23rd 
August 1996).
Later the 50,000 DM limit for the account decreased to 30,000 DM and cylinder 
capacity limit raised. So a worker can import an auto for a 30,000 DM deposit every 
year. But although there exist severe reaction from the industry, the decision is tried to 
be enlarged as one auto for every 30,000 DM deposit; in other words one worker can 
import many autos at the same time.
The President o f Sabancı Holding Sakıp Sabancı told that this decision is very wrong 
for the industry, investors and thousands o f employees in the industry. He also added 
that in order to compete in international markets, Turkish Auto Industry should 
increase production ( Milliyet, 23 rd August 1996).
Istanbul University Chairman o f European Community P rof Arif Esin pointed out that 
there were some desires from EC to Turkish Government in order to permit second­
hand auto imports. So Turkish Government have to accept this desire, but it will affect 
the Turkish Auto Industry in a negative way. Only the confirmation has shown the 
negative effects and the sales in the industry fell sharply as it brought expectations for 
low priced autos in the minds o f Turkish consumers. He also added that there would 
be imports from countries like South Korea, Russia, Slovakia and even USA who are 
not members o f EC (Auto Show, 30“* July 1996).
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Association o f Imported Autos President İlhan Çetinkaya told that the new decision o f 
the government will not provide funds for the Turkey but it will take away funds. This 
fond decrease from budget would be 2 billion DM per year. 100,000 employees will 
lose jobs and 20 billion US Dollar investment in Turkish Auto Industiy will be spoiled. 
He also added that Turkish auto exports, which has reached 3 billion DM per year, 
would be zero in 4 years time(Milliyet,24‘*' August 1996).
The government will also lose taxes by this decision as 50 % o f an average auto price 
are taxes. For example a Toyota Corolla produced by TOYOTA-SA and sold for 1 
650 million TL provide a tax income o f 825 million for the government 
(Doğru, 1996).
It can also be coûter argued that Turkish Auto Industry has exploited domestic market 
by prevention o f the government during the last 25 years. They produced low quality 
autos, couldn’t learn lowering production costs and selling at lower prices. This 
criticism may be true; but EC member countries, like Spain and Portugal don’t let 
second-hand auto imports and France provides a support o f 2,000 Francs for the 
domestically produced second-hand autos. So why does Turkish Government 
compress the domestic producers with such a decision (Doğru, 1996).
The Minister o f Industry Yalım Erez confirmed that their purpose for the decision is 
not to bankrupt Turkish Auto Industry. They also would not repeat the previous 
mistake which made Turkey a graveyard for the imported second-hand buses and 
trucks. Their only desire is ; Turkish Auto Industry’s successful competition with the
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World Auto Industry and providing high quality, low priced autos for the Turkish 
consumer as well as gaining the savings o f the Turkish worker living abroad to Turkish 
Economy. (Milliyet 24*** August 1996).
However in the last days o f August there are some signals that the government will 
soften the decision due to the severe reaction o f the industry and the syndicates. It is 
said that, the period for the duty-free imports will be shortened so that at most 10,000 
second hand imports could be made. Nothing is definite about this new decision yet 
and the demand for the domestically produced autos fell sharply and reached a bottom 
point at end o f August 1996.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Auto Industry provides benefits to nations’ economies by providing employment, 
increasing GNP and production. The industry connects many industries and plays a key 
role when determining the competitive power o f the nations. It also increases the 
governments’ revenues by providing tax income. So, auto industry is very important 
for developing as well as more developed countries and the government intervention 
and the relationship between government and the industry is critically important.
When the productivity and competition power o f Turkish Auto Industry is compared 
with world’s leading auto producing countries, it can easily be observed that Turkish 
Auto Industry’s figures are quite low.
The main reason for the industry being far behind Japan, European and American auto 
industries is the lack o f high level o f production quantities which would make new high 
technology investments feasible and shorten the amortization periods o f these projects. 
In order to achieve this Turkish Auto Industry should produce in economies scale .
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There are many reasons for this low level o f production and producing behind 
economies of scale. The most important reason is the lack of strong, stable domestic 
demand.
When the people that fall to one auto figures are examined it can easily be seen that 
Turkey is far behind many countries, including Russia and Yugoslavia, with 39 people 
per auto. So it can easily be guessed that there exists high potential demand for autos 
in Turkey.
This high domestic demand potential can not be transformed into real demand due to 
many reasons. The most important one is the lack of stable macro economical 
environment in the country. As Turkish Auto Industry generally supply for the 
domestic market, the sector is the one that is mostly affected when a financial or 
political crisis arise in the country. The examples are the Gulf War in 1991 and the 
financial crisis in 1994. In an high inflationary, unstable macro economic environment 
the demand for autos decrease as the interest rates increase and the real incomes of the 
consumers decrease.
The high level o f taxes which is directly reflected on the selling prices of autos is an 
important factor that avoids the demand for autos. These taxes, that reach about 40 to 
70 % o f the price o f an average auto, should be decreased to European Community 
standards which is 20-25 % . The tax income that is going to be lost by the 
government can be covered as the total demand increases.
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Consumer credits play a central role in the demand increase. As these credits increase 
the purchasing power o f the consumers, between 1990 and 1994 more than 30 % of 
the auto sales made by these credits. But in year 1994 these credits have lost their 
attraction between the consumers. Due to the financial bottlenecks in the country, the 
interest rates for these credits have increased and re payment periods decreased. So an 
average consumer could not afford to buy auto with these credits. These credits should 
be made attractive for the consumers again by the help o f producer companies.
The world auto industry is at the stage of integrating lean production which targets 
continually decreasing costs, zero defects, zero inventories and endless product 
variety. But Turkey is still trying to take the benefits o f mass production. The main 
reason behind Turkey’s being far away from up to date technologies and facing 
insufficient demand seems to lie in the undefined policy for Turkish Auto Industry. 
There is no master plan for the industry and the producers can not forecast the future 
of the industry so they can not invest in technological developments. There is no well 
defined policy for the auto industry, the regulations may change overnight, the tax 
rates and import duties change frequently which result in the fluctuating auto demand 
in the country. A long term master plan for the Turkish Auto Industry should be 
prepared together with the representatives of the industry and government officials so 
that the manufacturers forecast the future o f the industry easier and make investment 
decisions accordingly.
The new duty-free import policy o f the government is an example for this regulation 
changes overnight. By this policy, the Turkish people living abroad will have the right
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of importing duty free second hand autos when they invest some quantity o f foreign 
currency in an account for a one year time deposit at a pre-determined rate o f interest. 
This new decision would have a negative effect on Turkish Auto Industry as the prices 
o f these second hand imports can easily compete with the domestically produced new 
autos. Consequently, as soon as this new decision o f the government has been 
announced, the sales figures o f the domestically produced autos fell sharply and hit a 
bottom point. The government should rearrange this new decision as the effects o f the 
duty - free second hand imports will be very heavy for both Turkish Economy and 
Turkish Auto Industry. Turkey will become a graveyard for the imported second hand 
autos like the one that had occurred in 1985. The second hand auto imports should not 
be permitted for ten years period as stated in the 6**' March 1995 Customs Union 
Agreement.
If  the domestic demand is strengthened by the efforts o f the government and the 
producer firms, the domestic producers will reach producing in economies of scale. So 
there will be no severe difficulties for Turkish producers in competing with their 
foreign rivals after Customs Union Agreement. All o f the five producers in Turkey 
have foreign investment shares. They should determine strategies with their foreign 
partners and provide expertise on specific models so that they can reach international 
markets and export their products .
It is predicted that after Customs Union Agreement the number o f producer companies 
both in the Turkish Auto Industry and Allied Industry will be decreased and the 
remaining ones will produce in economies o f scale with higher technologies.
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A last point is that; for the time being the cinrent demand for autos in Turkey is not 
enough for the already existing five producers to produce in economies o f scale. It is 
known that permissions and subsidies will be provided by the government for some 
new companies to open plants and start production in the near future. However, in 
World Auto Industry some mergers take place between producers. As they converge 
their power, their competition power also increases by producing in economies o f 
scale. The new comers to  Turkish Auto Industry will not increase the competition 
power o f the whole industry but decrease it; as the demand diverges to many different 
producers, no one will produce in economies o f scale with lower fixed costs. So for the 
time being, the government should not permit new comers to open plants and start 
production.
The auto industry as a source o f  employment and technological development is very 
important for Turkish Economy, the government decisions are the key determinant for 
the future o f the industry - as it was in every auto producing country in tlie past - ,so 
Turkish Government should pay more attention and find solutions for the problems o f 
the industry.
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APPENDIX A -VARIABLES OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
8 2
TABLE A-1
YEAR TOTAL AUTO 
STOCK
POPULATION
(THOUSAND)
AUTOS PER 1,000 
PERSON
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
688,687
742,252
776,432
811,465
856,350
919,577
983,444
1,087,234
1,193,021
1,310,257
1,434,579
1,649,879
1,864,344
2,111,354
2,619,852
2,846,166
3,098,703
43,530
44,438
45,540
46,688
47,864
49,070
50,306
51,433
52,561
53,715
54,893
56,098
57,305
58,401
59,491
60,576
61,644
15.8
16.7 
17
17.4
17.9
18.7
19.6 
21.1
22.6 
24.2
25.8 
29
32.5 
36.1 
44 
47 
50
Source: Demirci , B. , ‘Taşıt Araçlan İmalat Sektöründe Gelişmeler ve
Beklentiler, TSKB , İstanbul, 1995 .
Türk Ekonomisi İstatistik ve Yorumlan , Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü , 
A nkara, 1991-1996 .
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TABLE A-2
YEAR AVERAGE PRICE OF CONSUMER PRICE DEFLATED PRICE 
AN AUTO INDEX
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
497,833
772,414
946,555
1,164,900
1,531,000
1,850,600
2.293.000 
3,825,667 
5,680,167 
8,265,833
16.468.000 
27,662,500
43,234,737
74,830,683
129,487,014
342,063,023
658,499,114
934
1,883
2,522
3,237
4,254
6,313
9,150
12,319
17,104
29,995
50,872
81,548
135,370
230,210
382,297
788,570
1,526,986
533
410
375
360
360
293
251
311
332
276
324 
339 
319
325 
338 
434 
431
Source: 1970-1984 ; Esen, A.S., 1985 . ‘ Türkiye’de Otomobil Talebi, Dünü,
Bugünü, Yarını,’ Paper presesented at the First Automotive and Allied Industry 
Symposium o f Turkish Chamber o f Mechanical Engineers.
1985-1995 Calculated from the auto prices given by Automotive 
Manufacturers Association.
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TABLE A-3
YEAR PRODUCTION INFLATION INTEREST
RATES
GNP PER CAHTA 
(USD)
1979 26,494 64 20 1,837
1980 31,529 107 33 1,556
1981 25,306 37 38 1,574
1982 31,195 27 41 1,387
1983 42,509 30 45 1,280
1984 54,832 50 45 1,234
1985 60,353 43 50 1,353
1986 82,032 29 41 1,487
1987 107,185 32 51 1,671
1988 120,796 68 69 1,747
1989 118,314 70 66 2,005
1990 167,556 53 57 2,667
1991 195,574 55 63 2,621
1992 265,245 62 69 2,708
1993 348,095 58 65 3,004
1994 212,651 121 129 2,184
1995 233,412 89 93 2,685
Source; Demirci , B. , ‘Taşıt Araçlan İmalat Sektöründe Gelişmeler ve 
Beklentiler, TSKB , İstanbul, 1995 .
Türk Ekonomisi İstatistik ve Yorumlan , Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü , 
A nkara, 1991-1996 .
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APPENDIX B - REGRESSION OUTPUTS
8 6
SUMMARY OUTPUT
IN FLA TIO N
5C
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.76095578
R Square 0.5790537
Adjusted R Square 0.5309907
Standard Error 9.825718201
Observations 17
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression
Residual
1
15
575.6936335
1448.171072
575.6936335
96.54473816
5.962972654 0.027473849
Total 16 2023.864706
Coefficients Standard Error tStat P-vaiue Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%Intercept 
X Variable 1
13.77048025
-0.222313
5.837162197
0.091040417
2.359105296
2.44191987
0.032301051
0.027473849
1.328855895
0.028265228
26.21210461
0.416361577
'1.328855895
0.028265228
26.21210461
0.416361577
SUMMARY OUTPUT
D E F L A T E D  P R IC E
ococ
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.642374572
R Square 0.412645091
Adjusted R Square 0.398727491
Standard Error 11.51965339
Observations 17
ANOVA
Intercept 
X Variable 1
Coefficients Stsndard Error 
19.28903646 15.21101203
-0.021192 0.042287095
tStat 
1.268096851 
0.501150787
P-value Lower 95% 
0.224093213 -13.13248815 
0.623539176 -0.068940654
Upper 95%
51.71056106
0.111325076
Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
-13.13248815 51.71056106 
-0.068940654 0.111325076
SUMMARY OUTPUT
IN T E R E S T  R A TE S
oc
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.857132101
R Square 0.734675439
Adjusted R Square 0.716987135
Standard Error 5.983204356
Observations 17
ANOVA
df h/IO
Regression 1
o o
1486.88369
Mo
1486.88369
F
41.53453235
Significance F 
1.10437E-05Residual 15 536.9810154 35.79873436Total 16 2023.864706
SUMM/i^ Y OUTPUT
GNP
8
Muttipie R 0.821635328
R Square 0.675084612
Adjusted R Square 0.653423587
Standard Error 6.621101547
Observations 17
ANOVA
SUMMARY OUTPUT
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 
R Square
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations
0.966561236
0.934240622
0.91232083
3.330266298
17
MULTIPLE REGRESSION PRODUCTION
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.952506779
R Square 0.907269163
Adjusted R Square 0.873548859
Standard Error 34439.1425
Observations 16
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 1.27647E+11 31911654718 26.90572292 1.25072E-05Residual 11 13046599898 1186054536
Total 15 1.40693E+11
Coefficients
-100537.6386
Standard Error 
65825.87815
tStat P-vaiue Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%Intercept 
X Variable 1 
X Variable 2 
X Variable 3 
X Variable 4
-214.4412682
-238.1923629
-117.2309591
131.3118119
481.321475
208.8866066
555.5859113
17.46536341
-1.527326964
-0.445526076
-1.140295047
2.106316174
7.518412804
0.154908385
0.664580604
0.278383226
0.05895193
1.17285E-05
-245419.4929
-1273.823228
-697.9489167
-52.5973732
92.87078676
44344.21559
844.9406913
221.5641908
2393.076556
169.752837
-245419.4929
-1273.823228
-697.9489167
-52.5973732
92.87078676
44344.21559
844.9406913
221.5641908
2393.076556
169.752837
